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In this paper, I examine the relation between moral skepticism and evolutionary ethics. I focus on Robert 
Richards’ ‘Revised Theory’ of evolutionary ethics (in his “A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics), and 
Robert Joyce’s introduction of the moral skeptic as an objection to Richards’ view (in his The Evolution 
of Morality). I argue that Joyce’s application of the moral skeptic (an individual who denies common-
sense moral judgments) is misaimed—for Richards can utilize a traditional response in moral theory and 
simply consider the skeptic beyond the pale of moral discourse. I then proceed to argue that the skeptic 
can be reintroduced at a further point in Richards’ argument, where he attempts to tease out the 
imperative force of ‘ought’ in moral contexts by appealing to the ‘structured context’ in which those 
‘ought’-propositions occur, and that, if we frame our application of the skeptic here carefully, a serious 
problem for Richards’ view (and by extension, naturalistic ethical programs generally). I conclude with 
an evaluation of a series of possible responses to the skeptic by a proponent of Richards’ view (most of 




In this paper, I address the engagement between Richards’ ‘Revised Version’ of 
evolutionary ethics (hereafter ‘RV,’ in his “A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics”) and 
Joyce’s objections to Richards’ view in “The Evolutionary Vindication of Morality.” In 
particular, I focus on Joyce’s introduction of the moral skeptic1—a hypothetical 
individual who denies common-sense judgments or beliefs about morality. Joyce, I 
contend, introduces the moral skeptic at an ineffectual stage in the argument; his 
skeptic simply rejects the common-sense moral judgments meant to justify the axioms 
and inference rules of the evolutionary ethical system. But this skeptic, I show, can 
simply be put to one side, grounding this move in Aristotelian precedent. Instead, I 
introduce the moral skeptic at a later stage in Richards’ argument: where he is 
attempting to provide the fine-grained sense of the use of ‘ought’ in moral contexts (in 
particular, its imperative force) by introducing the notion of ‘structured contexts’ 
(composed of the causal principles relevant to a particular situation or type of 
situation). Here, the moral skeptic denies the intuitive distinction between the 
imperative use of ‘ought’ in moral contexts and the instrumental (predictive) use of 
‘ought’ in non-moral contexts. The challenge to the proponent of RV is, then, to explain 
how her view differentiates between the two uses of ought—not to persuade the 
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skeptic, but rather to show a third-party observer that the position of RV and that of the 
skeptic are distinct. I conclude with an evaluation of a series of possible maneuvers 
available to the proponent of RV in attempting to meet this challenge. 
 
First, it is important sketch out the aspects of Richards’ argument most relevant for our 
purposes. Richards’ introduces a distinction between the ‘criterion of morality’ (that to 
act morally is to intend to act for the good of the community) and particular moral 
propositions which are judged to fall under this criterion at any given time. The former 
is universal (i.e.: obtaining across all human communities), while the latter can change 
across communities and time (281). The criterion of morality, in turn, is taken as an 
axiom of RV’s ethical system, and Richards argues that RV, like all axiomatic systems, 
must ultimately be grounded in facts—in particular, common-sense judgments relevant 
to the domain of the given system (284).2 This is how, Richards asserts, normative 
propositions are derived from factual propositions. But we still need the fine-grained 
sense of ‘ought’ used in moral contexts (specifically, its imperative/exhortatory force). 
To supply this force, Richards appeals to the ‘structured contexts’ of ought-
propositions, and the difference in structured contexts in the case of moral and non-
moral uses of ought (287-288). Ultimately, the possibility of Richards’ evolutionary 
ethics, or any naturalistic theory of ethics (i.e.: one that seeks to ground ethical truths in 
empirical truths) for that matter, hangs on these two arguments going through—for 
without them our ethical theory is without norms; that is, without an ethics. By 
applying skeptical considerations as a test of these arguments, then, we participate in an 
examination of the very possibility of naturalism in ethics.3 
 
With the broad framework in mind, I will now proceed to sketch out Richards’ 
argument for the claim that all axiomatic systems (including ethical systems) ultimately 
must appeal to empirical judgments, as well as Joyce’s introduction of the skeptic at 
this stage. It seems that Richards assumes all conceptual systems to have an axiomatic 
form—or, at least, that such systems are worthy of consideration by themselves.4 Given 
this assumption as the restriction on the domain of systems under consideration, it 
appears necessary that there is something (first principle or inference rule) within the 
system that cannot be justified by appeal to the system itself. That is, this principle(s) or 
rule(s) stands at the foundation of system—it is what the rest of the structure rests upon. 
The question thus arises: how do we justify these foundations? Richards’ answer is that 
we must appeal to factual considerations that apply outside of the domain relevant to 
the system; that is, common-sense judgments of some sort. In the case of ethical 
systems, the relevant judgments will be “common-sense moral judgments” (284), such 
as those reflected in the ethical injunctions of moral leaders of a community (282-83). 
In particular, for RV, we must justify the ‘criterion of morality’ (the good of the 
community) by appealing to common-sense moral judgments that accord with it. The 
core of the procedure seems to be to lay out a series of scenarios that lend themselves to 
clear moral judgments (‘easy cases make good law’), and show that the general 
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principle which relates all these judgments is precisely the ‘criterion of morality’ (or 
whatever other axiom we seek to justify).  
 
It seems that evolutionary theory plays two roles within this picture of justification. 
First, it serves to explain why we can take the common-sense moral judgments used to 
justify the criterion of morality as ‘common.’ Because community selection tends to 
select those communities that have these moral judgments that are directed towards the 
good of the community, those judgments have become more prevalent across time. 
Second, evolutionary facts themselves may function in place of common-sense moral 
judgments as the facts that we appeal to—Richards’ takes his appeal to show “how 
normative conclusions may be drawn from factual premises” generally, not one 
particular type of factual premises. While this second role may seem to stretch things, 
as it doesn’t obviously follow from the claim that common-sense facts can justify 
normative propositions that any facts (including evolutionary ones) can justify 
normative propositions, it seems that evolutionary facts are treated as common-sense 
facts within Richards’ framework, as he is taking the empirical assertions of 
evolutionary theory for granted (272). 
 
With this sketch of Richards’ argument in mind, we can introduce Joyce’s moral 
skeptic into the picture. It seems that the appeal to common-sense moral judgments is 
vulnerable to one who does not share such judgments—the moral skeptic. Joyce 
himself takes the moral skeptic to reject the appeal to authority inference rule that 
Richards posits (158), but as we might take the injunctions of moral authority as 
reflections of the common-sense moral judgments of the community as a whole, it 
seems that the skeptic really takes exception to these latter judgments—rejecting the 
appeal to authority is really a consequence of rejecting these judgments. Joyce takes the 
moral skeptic to pose a serious problem for RV (and presumably Richards’ model for 
justification of any ethical theory) because, if common-sense moral judgments are the 
ultimate justification for the axioms and inference rules of an ethical system (and 
thereby the system as a whole) and the skeptic denies these judgments, then it seems 
that the proponent of RV (or any other ethical theory) is left with no tools with which to 
persuade the skeptic. But this, Joyce contends: “undermines the whole enterprise, for 
the challenge of deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is,’ as it is classically conceived, is to try to 
convince a sensible [!] moral skeptic that her sensible acceptance of various relevant 
empirical data logically commits her to certain moral conclusions…. The trick is to get 
people who haven’t already agreed to a moral view to agree” (158, emphasis his). It is 
this contention that undermines Joyce’s position, as we will see. 
 
But first, it is important to get clear on what exactly the moral skeptic is rejecting. It 
seems that we might conceive of two scenarios: 
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(S1): The moral skeptic rejects some particular common-sense moral judgment 
(e.g.: Abortion is wrong; I ought to help old ladies cross the street.) 
(S2): The moral skeptic rejects any judgment that accords with Richards’ 
criterion of morality (or whatever other axiom or rule is under consideration). 
 
In fact, (S1) doesn’t seem to be a terribly troublesome ‘skeptic,’ as Richards’ view (and 
any empirically plausible ethical theory) can accommodate the rejection of particular 
judgments, for, Richards asserts: “what particular acts fall under the criterion [of 
morality] will continue to change” (281). This ‘skeptic’ seems to simply represent 
instances of moral disagreement, which can occur in virtue of changes of knowledge in 
a community (e.g.: that the sacrifice of virgins doesn’t actually help the crops grow) or 
further rational reflection on the purported value of a type of action to a given 
community.  
 
(S2), on the other hand, does appear to constitute a serious problem for RV. It seems 
that, in attempting to persuade a person to adopt some ethical framework, we can either 
appeal to the common-sense judgments that could justify the criterion of morality (or 
whatever other axiom or rule), or we could argue for the soundness of the common-
sense judgments under consideration by appealing to more principles. But if we’re 
dealing with a truly robust skeptic, there are no common-sense moral judgments that 
will be accepted, and the latter approach is viciously circular, as it seeks to offer 
justification for the criterion in question (via justification of the common-sense 
judgments that justify it) by appealing to principles that are justified by the criterion 
itself!  
 
Given this problem, one may be inclined to go back to the core assumption that makes 
the problem stick: that, as Joyce puts it, the whole point of a moral theory is to persuade 
one who doesn’t already (more or less) share its views on moral matters. Contrary to 
Joyce’s assertion, it does not appear that the classical conception of moral theory 
commits itself to the goal of persuading the skeptic. In particular, we can find a 
radically different response as far back as Aristotle. In The Nicomachean Ethics, the 
Philosopher asserts that “knowledge brings no benefit” to the person who lacks a 
sufficiently well formed character, either in virtue of immaturity or depravity in 
character (I.3 1095a, trans. Ostwald). That is, only those with a sufficiently well formed 
character are eligible to participate in moral discourse.5 But the moral skeptic, who 
denies the most straightforward of moral judgments, surely cannot be one with a 
sufficiently well formed moral character—if she were, she’d share these basic 
intuitions! Thus, a similar move seems available for the proponent of RV in response to 
the skeptic: one who rejects the common-sense moral judgments that justify the 
criterion of morality (and thereby rejects the criterion itself) is simply beyond the pale 
of moral discourse. Thus, RV can reject the assumption that it must persuade the moral 
skeptic in order to serve as a proper moral theory: a legitimate response to the skeptic 
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here is to just shrug one’s shoulders and say: ‘There’s nothing more I can do with you, 
until you come around to these basic intuitions.’  
 
One concern with this sort of move is that it may remove a significant proportion of 
people from the realm of moral discourse. In the case of Aristotelian ethics, the habits 
which are indicative of a moral character sufficiently well formed for moral discourse 
are quite strenuous, and there is reason to doubt that many actual people in fact satisfy 
the standard. We would thus be left with a moral elite dictating the justification for 
moral claims to the hoi polloi. It seems that RV can mitigate this concern, however, by 
noting that we should expect the vast majority of humans to share most common-sense 
judgments of morality, as they have been conditioned to do so by the selective 
pressures of community selection. As Richards observers: “Those protohumans 
lineages that have not had these traits [i.e.: instincts that compel one to act for the good 
of the community] selected for, have not been selected at all” (285). The moral skeptic 
who lacks these instincts would pick out the rare individual “who cannot comprehend 
the soundness of basic moral principles… [and who] we hardly regard as a man” (285). 
The view of the radical moral skeptic is a self-marginalizing view, removing itself from 
the moral discourse as natural selection removes its proponents from the species.  
 
It thus appears that we can diffuse the threat of the moral skeptic at the stage of RV’s 
argument that Joyce introduces her. Richards’ attempt to link normative propositions to 
factual propositions thus seems preserved from this line of objection. However, it also 
seems that we can reintroduce this skeptic at a later point in Richards’ argument—
where Richards attempts to tease out the imperative force of ought in virtue of 
‘structure contexts’—and, by properly framing the skeptical problem, present a serious 
issue for RV at this later stage. 
 
This stage of the argument begins by acknowledging the intuition that there is a 
distinction in usage between instrumental (predictive) ought and moral ought, where 
the latter tends to imply some sense of obligation (or imperative or exhortation). 
Richards attempts to make room for such a distinction in his discussion of Gewirth’s 
notion of ‘structured contexts.’ Gewirth states: “A context is structured when it is 
constituted by laws or rules which determine certain existential or practical necessities” 
(108). He argues that one way of deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’ appeals to these structured 
contexts. For example, we say that the ball ought to role down the ramp because of 
certain physical laws (e.g.: the law of gravitation) and physical conditions (the incline 
of the ramp and the height of the ball relative to the surface) which constitute the 
structured context. That is, we appeal to these laws and conditions when we assert that 
the release of the ball should be followed by its rolling down the ramp. Likewise, in the 
case of human action, we appeal to the relevant ‘laws or rules’ which apply to that 
structured context. In particular, Richards asserts, we appeal to evolutionary facts about 
the way that a given human agent has been conditioned to behave (as well as perhaps 
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social facts which bear an intimate relation to community selective pressures), and “the 
constructive forces of evolution impose a practical necessity on each man to promote 
the community good” by performing or not performing the act in question (288). And 
because we take acting for the community good as the meaning of ‘moral,’ we say that 
the agent in question ought to perform the action.  
 
The moral skeptic comes into play here by denying the intuitive distinction between the 
predictive use of ought exemplified in the case of the ball on the ramp, and the 
imperative use of ought in the case of human action (e.g.: Johnny ought to help the old 
lady with her groceries.). The challenge for RV is to justify this difference in force of 
the assertions under consideration, in order to distinguish her position from the 
skeptical one. Mere stipulation won’t do, as the difference the intuition refers to is a 
substantive one (i.e.: the semantic distinction between the imperative and the mere 
predictive). Moreover, we can frame the problem in such a way that the maneuver 
undertaken above (putting the skeptic to one side) is unavailable. That is, rather than 
taking the challenge as to persuade the skeptic of the difference between the use of 
‘ought’ in moral and non-moral contexts, we can frame it as a challenge for the 
proponent of RV to distinguish her position from the skeptic’s for a third-party observer 
(who shares the intuitive distinction between the force of moral and non-moral 
‘oughts’). If the proponent of RV is unable to justify the asserted distinction between 
moral and non-moral ‘oughts’ within the framework available to her (specifically, by 
appealing to differences in ‘structured context’) to a third-party observer, so that RV is 
undistinguishable from the moral skeptic’s position in any substantial way, then it 
seems that RV is an unsatisfactory moral theory—as any satisfactory moral theory will 
adequately distinguish itself from the skeptical position which we, by default, reject. 
 
Here are three possible lines the proponent of RV might take to justify the distinction 
between moral and non-moral ‘ought,’ along with evaluations of each: 
 
• Mitigating Factors: One might be inclined to claim that the case of human 
action has certain mitigating factors that give rise to the imperative force of 
ought in the context. That is, Johnny could do otherwise than help the old 
lady cross the street, but a ball could not do anything but roll down the ramp 
once it is released. Depending on how narrow the set of counterfactuals we 
are permitted to consider is, this move either commits us to causal 
indeterminacy in the case of human action or allows non-moral structured 
contexts to also have mitigating factors. The former disjunct requires that 
we hold all causal elements of the structured context the same, but claim 
that the agent could have done otherwise—which is to say that the causal 
elements of a scenario do not determine the result, a consequence 
unacceptable in the naturalistic framework of RV. Or we say that the causal 
elements themselves could have been different—but this is also the case for 
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non-moral uses of ought as well (e.g.: the ball ought to have rolled down the 
ramp, but the coefficient of friction was too high.). So mitigating factors 
cannot distinguish between predictive and imperative uses of ought. 
• Phenomenology: One might claim that the difference is in the way we 
experience the utterance or thought of ought in the case of moral and non-
moral contexts. That is, we experience ought in the moral context in a 
certain ‘intense’ way (inescapable practical necessity) which we pick out 
with the term ‘imperative;’ while in the non-moral context our experience of 
ought is less ‘intense’ (mere expectation), which we pick out with the term 
‘predictive.’ But the phenomenological distinction doesn’t seem so clear: 
ordinary use of the term ‘ought’ in mere predictive contexts can have a 
certain intensity similar to that of the moral case. For example, one might 
express consternation at a snowy April day by exclaiming: ‘It ought to be 70 
degrees out, it’s April!’6 Or conversely, one may use a moral ought with less 
intensity, such as when one remarks ‘That guy ought to hold the door open 
for those coming in behind him.’ So it doesn’t seem that the 
phenomenological distinction of intensity maps cleanly onto the moral/non-
moral ‘ought’ distinction. Moreover, even if we could improve the mapping, 
it doesn’t seem that a phenomenological examination can offer the 
justification that the proponent of RV needs; RV needs to justify the 
intuitive distinction between moral and non-moral ‘ought,’ but appeal to the 
phenomenology of ‘ought’ seems just to reiterate this intuition, which is 
precisely what the skeptic rejects.  
• Causal role of the ought-propositions: Finally, one might point out that, in 
moral contexts, utterances or token thoughts of the ought-proposition exert a 
causal influence on the agent, while, in contrast, the ought-proposition 
exerts no such causal influence in non-moral cases (I can yell myself blue in 
the face, but that’s not going to make a saw cut pine wood.). Perhaps the 
‘imperative’ force of ought really picks out this causal role of token 
instances of the proposition in moral contexts. While I think this is the 
strongest case to be made for the distinction between moral and non-moral 
‘ought,’ one may be inclined to think that it simply pushes the problem back 
a step—we still need to explain why moral ought-propositions are able to 
exert this causal influence on the agent. 
 
In light of these considerations, one might begin to doubt that RV can in fact account 
for the difference in the force of moral and non-moral ‘ought.’ Such doubt leads us to a 
final disjunction: either RV is unsatisfactory as a moral theory or the problem posed by 
the introduction of the skeptic makes an unwarranted assumption (namely, that there is 
a distinction between moral and non-moral ought). While I have not the space here to 
adjudicate such a disjunction, I will note that it bears formal similarity to Joyce’s 
skeptical problem above (where Joyce assumes the goal of moral theory to be the 
Res Cogitans (2013) 4                                                                                                            Yaure | 70 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
persuasion of the moral skeptic), so that we may be inclined to make a parallel move 
and reject the presupposition of the distinction between moral and non-moral ‘ought.’ 
However, though such a move is logically open to the proponent of RV here, we may 
question the wisdom of executing it. In rejecting Joyce’s supposition, we were able to 
show that the implicit historical grounding (‘classical conception’) of his claim was not 
in fact so clear, deflating that horn of his dilemma. Here, we seem hard pressed to 
deflate our intuitions in a similar way, so the move would do damage to genuine beliefs 
we have about moral ‘ought.’ The question thus becomes: to what extent ought we 
sacrifice our pre-theoretical intuitions in order to maintain our moral theory? It seems 
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1 Because I am limiting myself, primarily for reasons of scope, to the moral skeptic, I 
will not consider more general forms of epistemological skepticism. Thus, for example, 
skeptical concerns about the validity of scientific induction in general or the empirical 
grounding of evolutionary theory in particular are off the table. In this limitation, I am 
following Richards’ assumption in “A Defense of Evolutionary ethics” of the truth of 
the empirical assertions of evolutionary theory (272). 
 
2 One may read Richards’ as contending that axiomatic systems must be grounding in 
some facts, not necessarily common-sense ones—in particular, evolutionary facts can 
play this justifying role for RV. But, as Richards’ takes the truth of evolutionary theory 
for granted in the paper, it seems that he is effectively treating them as common-sense 
judgments. 
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3 Richards himself contends that all ethical systems must be grounded in empirical 
knowledge (specifically of human nature and our moral intuitions, 281-82), not just 
‘naturalistic’ ones. We might take this as a sweeping ‘naturalizing’ move (i.e.: that all 
ethical systems are inherently justified by appeal to the natural world), rather than as a 
claim about the empirical dependence of ethical systems regardless of their ‘natural’ or 
‘non-natural’ status. 
 
4 An interesting note, then, which will not be explored further in this paper, is that even 
if one rejects Richards’ justification for axioms and inference rules, one need not give 
up on the possibility of systematic knowledge: we may (after deciding to ditch the 
foundationalist view Richards adopts) simply shift to a coherentist (web-like) view of 
justification.  
 
5 This is not to say that those without sufficiently well formed moral character cannot be 
subject to moral evaluation of judgment—it is just as wrong for them to commit murder 
as the morally well formed character (though the latter case has the bonus of a logical 
contradiction). It is solely the claim that such individuals are not eligible participants in 
the discourse that explores and justifies these moral judgments. 
 
6 Or, for an even stronger, though hypothetical, example: imagine a case where lightning 
strikes but thunder does not follow. It seems that the exclamation of ‘ought’ in ‘It ought 
to thunder!’ would be forcefully on par with many of our moral exhortations.  
